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Is the ‘Rule of law’ an Antidote for Religious Tension? 
The Promise and Peril of Judicializing Religious Freedom 
 
For years a particular way of thinking about the relationship between religious strife, law, 
and legal processes has dominated conversations among scholars, human rights activists and 
policy makers. This way of thinking sees law as an antidote to religious tensions. ‘Rule of law’, 
the logic goes, acts as a force of moderation and, in matters of religion, serves a key tool for 
mollifying or resolving disputes.  
One does not have to go far to find examples of this paradigm in action. In a December 
2013 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, eulogized the power of law to help resolve chronic patterns 
of religious violence and hatred. He insisted that  
[a]n open constitutional framework that allows free manifestations of existing or 
emerging religious pluralism on the basis of equal respect for all is a sine qua non of any 
policy directed toward eliminating collective religious hatred by building trust through 
public institutions. (United Nations General Assembly 2013: 11) 
 
According to Bielefeldt, it is institutions of law—above all constitutions and the courts 
that interpret them—which serve as bulwarks against religious strife, polarization and hatred. 
Constitutional law, he insists, is central to resolving conflicts among religious groups.1 
Bielefeldt’s perspective finds considerable support in academic writing on constitutional law and 
human rights. One influential example of this can be seen in Ran Hirschl’s important book, 
Constitutional Theocracy, in which he writes that constitutional courts exert a tempering effect 
on the intensities of religious interests in public life such that “constitutional law and courts in 
virtually all such polities have become bastions of relative secularism, pragmatism, and 
moderation” (2010: 13). 
                                                          
1 Bielefeldt explains that religious tensions should not be understood as ‘natural phenomenon’, but rather as the 
product of identity politics and other political dynamics. In this rendition, courts are imagined as institutions with the 
unique ability to rise above politics rather than being enmeshed in politics. 
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Although intuitively attractive, this understanding of law as a salve for religious strife 
belies the escalation of religious tensions that often accompanies the judicialization of such 
disputes in much of South and Southeast Asia. A closer look at the recent history in Sri Lanka, 
India, Malaysia and Pakistan suggests that religion-related court cases have not always generated 
the mollifying effects that Hirschl and Bielefeldt describe. Rather than serving as mechanisms to 
soften religious boundaries and harmonize religious interests, legal processes and institutions 
frequently produce a hardening of boundaries and sharpening of antagonisms among religious 
communities. Often, law intensifies religious conflict. 
This study examines how and why this intensification comes about. In what follows, we 
argue that law and courts have played key roles in shaping and encouraging processes of 
religious polarization. Our exploration of the polarizing effects of legal action on religious 
communities draws on concrete experiences from four countries: Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and 
Pakistan. In addition to examining the religio-legal encounter in each, these case studies 
highlight four specific mechanisms through which the process of polarization works. Among 
other modes, polarization occurs as a result of: the procedural requirements and choreography of 
litigation (Sri Lanka), the language and decisions of court judgments (India), the activities of 
partisan activists who mobilize around litigation (Malaysia), and violent actions that take place to 
protest a legal defense of rights (Pakistan). Each of the four case studies illustrates how legal 
institutions sometimes exacerbate religious tensions. By focusing on four cases across South and 
Southeast Asia, we hope to underline the fact that these are not anomalous dynamics, specific to 
any one case. Rather, they point to a much broader set of mechanisms that extend far beyond the 
four countries under study. Given this comparative reach, we believe that scholars and 
policymakers should direct greater attention to the counterproductive dynamics that often 
accompany the judicialization of disputes related to religion.  
1. Sri Lanka: Polarizing Procedures  
To say that law generates conflict might appear obvious, even mildly tautological. 
Among other things, law serves as a formalized system for framing disputes in public settings; its 
defining function, in part, involves the ordered presentation of competing claims. However, in 
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ordering these claims and presenting them for adjudication, legal processes do not simply take 
social disputes as they are, in all their complexity. Rather, legal institutions produce for the court 
certain types of disputes that can be resolved by the court: disputes between two parties, over 
specific and well-circumscribed matters of law (e.g. over particular rights or duties). In many 
cases this process of translating conflict from social-political domains into a legal domain 
unwittingly and unknowingly serves to further sharpen the interests that gave rise to conflict in 
the first place.  
The polarizing effects of constitutional litigation can be seen clearly in the context of 
popular and legal contests over religious conversion—particularly conversions to Christianity—
in Sri Lanka.2 From the late 1990s until 2004, one sees in civil society and the media a vigorous 
debate over the proselytizing activities of new, evangelical Christian organizations. These 
organizations had come to the island in recent decades, and had set up churches in rural and 
urban areas that were badly affected by poverty and civil war. By the late 1990s, some Sri 
Lankans became increasingly concerned that these groups were using ‘unethical’ techniques to 
convert Buddhists, Hindus and Catholics to evangelical Christianity. The alleged techniques 
included giving cash or other gifts to new converts, helping them with securing visas to live 
overseas, employing them within church NGOs and extending other types of inducements to 
convert. 
In the early 2000s, a variety of religious organizations issued public statements indicating 
their concern about the possibility of ‘unethical’ conversions taking place. The Catholic Bishops 
Congress put out press releases expressing their concern over the “the social unrest alleged to be 
caused by certain activities of the fundamentalist Christian sects.”3 Hindu groups, including the 
All-Ceylon Hindu Congress and others, condemned what they saw as the cynical conversion of 
war-affected Tamils by Christian groups posing as relief organizations. The Hindu author of one 
Tamil-language editorial from 2000 (celebrated and reprinted in the Hindu Organ) even called 
upon Hindus to recognize the threat posed by new, foreign, extremist Christian groups, supported 
by foreign powers who “exploit the situation of poverty and war” to undertake a project similar 
                                                          
2 For more detailed analysis of these dynamics in the Sri Lankan case, see Schonthal (2014).  
3 “No links with fundamentalist sects, say Catholic Bishops,” Daily News Deccember 19, 2003. 
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to colonial-era Christians: inculcate Christianity and destroy local cultural values.4 Most 
prominently, a variety of Buddhist organizations rallied together to raise awareness about and 
combat the alleged unethical conversions among poorer urban and village population.  
At the same time, there were also religious groups who were working together to think of 
ways to allay concerns and propose solutions. In Colombo, several Christian groups met to 
consider developing a common protocol of ‘ethical’ evangelizing for Sri Lanka. Similarly, 
representatives from popular Buddhist and Hindu organizations met to discuss the legal limits 
that could be applied to ‘forcible’ conversions. In fact, in early 2004, this Hindu-Buddhist group 
even completed a draft bill, which they submitted for consideration to the president in January.5  
One could summarize the terrain of disputes over religious conversion in January 2004 as 
one in which a wide variety of religious groups were actively collaborating in deciding how to 
address allegations about unethical conversions in different ways. Some Hindu and Buddhist 
groups worked together in pursuing legal measures, while Catholics and certain mainline 
Protestants—who were sympathetic to the concerns of Buddhists and Hindus—were in the 
process of developing their own ‘in-house’ manuals and protocols of ‘ethical’ conversion.6  
Looking at the situation six months later, however, one sees a radical pattern of 
polarization. From a situation in which a variety of religious communities were involved in inter- 
and intra-religious dialogue over how best to deal with the problem of religious conversion, the 
issue of conversion suddenly split conservative Buddhists from all other religious communities. 
A major catalyst for this polarization was a large court case involving constitutional review of a 
bill designed to criminalize certain types of proselytizing activities. 
Between January and July 2004, during the time that Christian groups were deliberating 
and while the Hindu-Buddhist draft bill was being considered by the government, another draft 
legislation purporting to combat ‘forcible conversion’ found its way to the floor of parliament. 
Called the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill, this draft law appeared on parliament’s Order 
                                                          
4 “Matamārrattil īṭupaṭuvōr Manitanēyamarravarkaḷ” (trans. ‘Those who engage in Conversion Have no 
Compassion for Humanity’) Reprinted in intucātanam, November 12, 2000, 26. 
5 This bill was never taken up by parliament. 
6 Interview with a Methodist church leader, May 6, 2009. 
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Paper in May 2004 as a Private Members’ Bill introduced by the newly elected Buddhist 
nationalist political party known as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Unlike the bill produced by 
the Hindu-Buddhist committee described above, the JHU’s bill was not the product of extensive 
discussions. Instead it was an almost-verbatim copy of a conversion bill that had been introduced 
(and repealed) in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Like the Tamil Nadu bill, it rendered as a 
criminal offense any attempt to convert a person from one religion to another by means of 
physical force, financial ‘allurement’ or ‘fraud’.  
Despite obvious substantive and procedural problems with the JHU’s bill, the 
introduction of the bill had the effect of pushing previously multifaceted discussions over 
conversion onto a path of constitutional litigation. Predictably, a variety of evangelical Christian 
groups opposed the bill and, turning to a form of legal action, invoked constitutional procedures 
of pre-enactment judicial review, requesting the Supreme Court to rule that the bill violated 
fundamental rights to freedom of religion. Equally predictably, the more nationalistically 
inclined Buddhist groups, such as the JHU, rallied behind the bill and intervened against the 
judicial-review petitions.  
What is notable is that the Catholic Bishops, Hindu groups and more centrist Buddhists—
all of whom had previously voiced sympathetic concern over the popular anxieties about 
‘unethical’ conversions—were now in a bind. With the arrival of a litigious framework, they 
found themselves pulled toward the inflexible position of taking one side (that of the nationalist 
Buddhist JHU and its bill) or the other side (that of opponents calling for pre-enactment judicial 
review to prevent legal limitations on conversion) in response to an issue that, for them, was 
much more complex. The same Hindu and Christian individuals and groups that had been 
involved with designing other types of solutions petitioned against the bill; conservative 
Buddhist groups that had previously worked alongside Hindu organizations to draft their own 
bill joined the JHU in their legal defense. In interviews conducted in 2008 and 2009, 
representatives from all sides indicated how unsatisfactory and frustrating this shake-down was. 
One Buddhist member of the Buddhist-Hindu working committee characterized the experience 
of committee members as follows:  
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[S]ome people felt, what is the point in this [JHU Conversion] bill, it is bloody useless we 
will not have this bill. But most of the people felt, “well half a loaf is better than none, let 
us at least have this….”7 
 
Similar appraisals were made by members of Christian and Hindu groups that were 
interviewed, many of whom referred to the fact that, with the turn toward litigiousness, all other 
attempts at dealing with the issue of unethical conversion abruptly halted. 
This is not to say that there were no attempts to communicate the complexity of the issues 
at play; some petitioners did. Yet these suggestions of complexity were ultimately drowned out 
or obscured in the gross logic of a more powerful litigiousness, which presented the debate—to 
both the court and, significantly, to the public-at-large who followed these proceedings with 
interest in newspapers and on TV—as an agonistic battle between two parties: opponents and 
supporters of the bill, or, even more starkly, as opponents or supporters of formal, state-based, 
legal limits on ‘unethical’ conversion. That is, the logic, choreography and procedural 
requirements of constitutional review—which remained ‘hard wired’8 to present the debate as a 
contest between two opposing parties, petitioners and intervening petitioners—worked to dilute 
and even cover over the many creative solutions that had been proposed previously by groups 
and alliances representing a variety of religious organizations and denominations. For example, 
there had been serious discussions about the development of an interreligious committee to 
investigate allegations of conversion.  
The above anecdote serves as a powerful illustration of the ways in which institutional 
structures work to determine not only the types of social boundaries formed but the rigidity or 
‘brightness’ of the lines that are drawn. In this case, constitutional frameworks and the protocols 
and procedures they impose on articulating and managing conflict worked to transform what 
were previously multi- and interreligious groups into a stark ‘Buddhist v. others’ binary. In 
addition, the many possibilities for realignment and border-crossing that presented themselves 
prior to the JHU-bill case, seemed to disappear: once processed through the authorized 
                                                          
7 Interview with a committee member, May 17, 2009. 
8 See Moustafa 2014, and below here. 
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mechanics of constitutional litigation, Sri Lankans found it difficult to reclaim or recover the 
terms and creativity of a more fluid pre-litigation state.  
2. India: Polarizing Judgments 
The use of religion for political mobilization in India can be attributed to constitutional 
and legal interpretations that have, in some cases, circumscribed access to affirmative action 
benefits and, in others, curtailed specific forms of religious freedom (e.g. the right to propagate 
one’s faith). Contrary to the Hirschl thesis that court rulings defuse or at least moderate the dark 
side of religion in the public sphere, law and judgments have played a key role in creating the 
ammunition that has been subsequently used by socio-religious groups, particularly the Hindu 
Right, to polarize discourse and deepen discord.9  
About 80% of the 1.21 billion Indians are Hindus, a religion hierarchically constructed 
through the caste system; 13% are Muslims and 2% are Christians.10 Most conversions in 
independent India occur among scheduled castes (SC) and tribes (indigenous peoples) who want 
to improve their low social standing by converting to Islam and Christianity, which promise 
‘equality’ to their congregants. In a bid to deliver social justice, the Indian Constitution limits 
affirmative action benefits (quotas reserved in government jobs, political constituencies and 
educational institutions) to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. However, by confining the 
legal definition of a scheduled caste to Hinduism, the constitution inadvertently installs barriers 
to conversion from Hinduism, prompting religious minorities to call the state ‘pro-Hindu’. Judges 
have to decide whether the right to propagate, which is part the right to profess and practice 
religion enshrined in Article 25, can involve conversion.  
                                                          
9 Hindu Right is the term used to characterize the Hindu social, religious and political organizations that cluster 
under the umbrella of Sangh Parivar. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is part of this group. Their ideology is 
Hindutva, which a founder (Savarkar) defines as “embracing all the departments of thought and activity of the whole 
Being of our Hindu race.” 
10 Caste is a complete system that impacts every aspect of a Hindu’s existence determining the social status, 
occupational and economic roles (especially in rural areas). At the top are priests (Brahmins), warriors/princes 
(Kshatriyas), then traders (Vaishyas) and farmers (Sudras). The untouchables (scheduled castes) are on the bottom 
most rung.  
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These contradictory impulses in the constitution’s directives have led to a situation where 
the judiciary has directly curtailed the ability of a scheduled caste convert to access affirmative 
action benefits, while indirectly encouraging re-conversions to Hinduism, usually carried out by 
the Hindu Right. An analysis of 80 religious conversion cases in the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court clearly reveal the pro-Hindu bias of India’s judiciary. The cases, which pertain to 
personal law (38%), affirmative action benefits (42%) and propagation (15%), deal with 
reconversions to Hinduism (36%), and conversions to Islam (23%) and Christianity (28%). In 
over half of the cases dealing with affirmative action, scheduled caste converts to Islam and 
Christianity were stripped of their welfare benefits. But on re-conversion to Hinduism, the court 
allowed the scheduled caste re-convert to regain the privileges as long as he could prove that the 
caste had accepted him into its fold on grounds that affirmative action is a group right (S. 
Anbalangan v. B. Devarajan, 1984 AIR 411). Christian litigants were less likely to win cases that 
challenged anti-conversion laws and the circumscribed nature of affirmative action benefits.  
The link between court judgments and the polarizing forms of religious mobilization is 
evident in two sets of cases: in those cases dealing with anti-conversion bills passed in several 
regional states; and in cases pertaining to the classification of ‘Hindutva’.  
In 1978, the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act (passed in 1968) prohibiting 
conversion by force, fraud or inducement and prescribing one year’s imprisonment and a fine 
was challenged in the High Court by Reverend Stanislaus on grounds that the definition of 
inducement was overbroad. The High Court upheld the Act saying it pertained to public order, 
not religious freedom. The Reverend approached the Supreme Court and lost. In the judgment 
(Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 2 SCR 611), the Chief Justice of India said that 
“there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion,” and such a right 
“would impinge on the freedom of conscience guaranteed to all citizens of the country alike.” A 
Hindu right-wing member introduced the Freedom of Religion Bill in December 1978 that 
sought to prohibit conversion from one religion to another by the use of force or inducement or 
by fraudulent means, and cited the Stanislaus judgment as legitimizing the Bill. The Bill did not 
pass because the Prime Minister of the ruling coalition withdrew support after an agitation by 
Christian groups. Similar bills were passed in Gujarat, Chattisgarh and Himachal Pradesh 
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(challenges are pending in the courts), and in 2005, the AIADMK-led11 Tamil Nadu government 
had to withdraw a similar bill after suffering electoral losses in the parliamentary elections. 
Interviews with politicians in Tamil Nadu suggest that the parties were aware of the court’s 
disinclination to strike down anti-conversion laws.  
The contradictory set of judgments on Hindutva highlights how law can deepen 
religiously infused polarization by blurring the line between religion and ideology, and religion 
and politics. The Supreme Court’s judgments have classified Hindutva as religious rhetoric and 
banned its use in election speeches (Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 SC 1918), and have also 
said that Hindutva “could not be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry” 
and hence cannot be prohibited from being used for political mobilization (Justice J.S.Verma in 
Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurau Patil, 1996, 1 SCC). The Hindu Right gleefully used the Joshi 
judgment to legitimize its use of Hindutva. “I feel extremely gratified about yesterday’s verdict 
…. principally because the Constitution Bench has lent its seal of Judicial imprimatur to BJP’s 
ideology of Hindutva,” said L.K. Advani, the President of the BJP, in a special press statement 
on the Hindutva case verdict. 
Thus, we see a similar process of translation of court rulings by civil society and political 
actors in India, as in Malaysia, but here the Hindu Right has translated the judgments into a 
narrative of legitimacy for its stance. The last two decades have seen a growing use of judgments 
on conversion and on the nature of Hinduism by the Hindu Right to legitimize controversial and 
polarizing positions on religious freedom and minority rights. The pattern in the 80 cases 
mentioned above indicates that judgments were more pro-reconversion to Hinduism and anti-
conversion to Islam and Christianity during governments led by the BJP (a quarter of the 80 
cases). Concerns about the decay of the judiciary, and the growing incidence of charges of 
corruption of judges, either monetarily or through post-retirement appointments to lucrative 
government and private sector positions, do not augur well for the impartiality of the courts. 
Interviews with ideologues of the RSS12 and other organizations of the Hindu Right also reveal a 
                                                          
11 AIADMK stands for All India Anna Dravidian Progress Federation, a state political party in Tamil Nadu and 
Puducherry. 
12 RSS is the Hindi acronymn for National Volunteer Corps, an organization founded in Maharashtra in 1925 that 
champions Hindutva, or ‘Hindu-ness’. 
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positive view of the court’s judgments on conversion. According to this view, the court tried to 
“minimize the harmful impact of the constitution” and “balanced” the needs of (the 
predominantly Hindu) society by handing down judgments against conversion and “upholding 
Hinduism or Hindutva as part of the national character rather than confining it to a religion on 
par with Islam and Christianity.”13 In short, the Hindu Right attributed the rise in religious 
intolerance to a constitutional right protecting propagation.  
In December 2014, the conversion of 350 Muslims in Agra to Hinduism reportedly by the 
RSS sparked a call for ‘anti-conversion’ laws. “Now is the Modi government not free to bring a 
law to ban conversions by inducement and fraud, including Agra conversions?” asks S. 
Gurumurthy in an editorial article in the New Indian Express on December 15, 2014. “It is. If it 
does, can the ‘seculars’ oppose it? Cannot. Because if they do then they cannot fault Agra 
conversions. If they do not, then they cannot oppose a law that will stop millions of Hindus being 
converted through inducement and allurement.” The public performance of Hindu rituals by 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Nepal, the declaration that all Indian citizens 
are Hindus, and the renaming of Christmas to ‘good governance day’ raise the worrisome 
prospect that public discourse will shift further from one relatively tolerant of diversity to one 
that conforms to a unifying and homogenising Hindutva. Courts, by further hardening boundaries 
and sharpening antagonisms among religious communities, will have to share the blame for this 
shift.  
3. Malaysia: Polarizing Activists 
Over the past decade, the Malaysian courts have stood at the center of heated debates 
concerning religious freedom. Conventional accounts trace these tensions to the rise of 
Malaysia’s dakwah (religious revival) movement, which has been the most dynamic social and 
political trend since the late 1970s. According to this understanding, legal controversies around 
religious freedom are the result of a standoff originating outside the courts between an ascendant 
religious movement and a liberal legal order. And, framed this way, the question that naturally 
                                                          
13 Interview with S. Gurumurthy, an ideologue of the RSS and a co-convenor of the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, an 
organization for promoting the awareness of Indian tradition, March 6, 2007, Chennai. 
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follows is whether the courts have the ability and resolve to uphold religious liberty, or if they 
will succumb to popular political pressure.14 This understanding of the root problem (religious 
revival) and what is at stake (liberty) comes effortlessly because it matches our taken-for-granted 
understanding of the role of the law and the courts in defending fundamental liberties and 
sustaining secularism.  
But this functional understanding precludes deeper insight into the fact that appeals to 
religious liberty are invoked by a variety of actors, including religious actors, each working at 
cross-purposes. Claims to religious liberty, for instance, are often made by religious minority 
groups (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Taoist, and heterodox Muslims) vis-à-vis the Muslim 
majority. But spokespersons for the Muslim majority also deploy ‘rights talk’ vis-à-vis religious 
minority groups, claiming that the latter should not infringe on the ‘religious freedom’ of the 
majority. Indeed, claims to religious freedom are not only voiced across communal lines; they 
are also heard within religious communities, as individuals assert the right to religious liberty for 
their own persons, whereas spokespersons of religious communities simultaneously invoke 
religious liberty in their claim to defend collective norms from state interference.  
These dynamics were at work in the most well-known Malaysian court case, Lina Joy v. 
Religious Council of the Federal Territories,15 which lasted for nearly a decade and became a 
public spectacle at home and abroad. The case concerned a woman who sought state recognition 
of her religious conversion. In litigating Joy’s right to religious freedom, her attorneys 
challenged the personal status laws in force in the Federal Territories, which provide no viable 
avenue for conversion out of Islam. Joy’s attorneys argued that the laws violated her right to 
religious freedom, a right enshrined in Article 11 of the Malaysian Constitution, which states (in 
part) that “Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion….” But Joy’s opponents 
invoked another clause from the same article, which states that “Every religious group has the 
                                                          
14 As previously noted, an expansive argument concerning the interface of constitutionalism and increased 
religiosity worldwide is Hirschl (2010). For an example of this framing in relation to Malaysia specifically, see Liow 
(2009). 
15 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain lain [2007] 4 M.L.J. 585 (Malay.), affirming Lina 
Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119 (Malay.).  
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right…to manage its own religious affairs.[emphasis added].” This second set of attorneys also 
claimed the right to religious freedom, but they argued that Article 11 is meant to safeguard the 
ability of religious communities to craft their own rules and regulations (including rules of entry 
and exit), free from outside interference. It is striking that protagonists on both sides of the 
controversy invoked religious freedom, and both sides called upon the state to secure these 
alternate visions. In short, disputes over religious liberty were, to a very large extent, the product 
of law and legal institutions. And, interestingly, there are striking parallels between the 
judicialization of religious disputes in Malaysia and our other three cases.  
While the legal battle raged for over a decade in the Malaysian courts of law, an even 
greater battle raged in the court of public opinion, with politicians, media outlets, and civil 
society groups shaping public discourse along two competing frames. Liberal rights groups 
formed a coalition named ‘Article 11’ after the article of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing 
freedom of religion. The coalition included the most prominent human rights groups and as well 
as the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and 
Taoism (MCCBCHST)—an umbrella organization representing the concerns of non-Muslim 
communities in Malaysia. The objective of the Article 11 coalition was to focus public attention 
on the erosion of individual rights and to “ensure that Malaysia does not become a theocratic 
state.”16 The coalition produced a website, short documentary videos, and recorded roundtables 
on the threat posed by Islamic law. They went on to organize a series of public forums across 
Malaysia.  
Parallel to this mobilization of liberal rights organizations, a broad array of conservative 
Muslim NGOs united in a coalition calling itself Muslim Organizations for the Defense of Islam 
(Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam), or Defenders (PEMBELA) for short. PEMBELA’s 
founding statement explained that the immediate motivation for organizing was the ongoing 
court cases which, in their view, challenged “the position of Islam in the Constitution and the 
                                                          
16 Article 11 Coalition, http://www.article11.org/ (accessed March 2, 2010). The website has since been closed. 
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legal system of this country.”17 PEMBELA organized dozens of public forums and flooded the 
Malay language press with hundreds more articles and opinion pieces on the need to defend the 
autonomy of the shariah courts from outside interference.  
The abovementioned case of Lina Joy remained largely unknown to the Malaysian public 
until it was brought into the media spotlight by political activists—liberals and conservatives 
alike—who advanced competing frames of understanding.18 Taken from the court of law and 
deployed in the court of public opinion, however, these legal controversies assumed a different 
character. Political entrepreneurs, particularly those on the conservative side of the divide, were 
not interested in the technical details of the cases. Quite the opposite, they mobilized around the 
cases to advance more expansive rights claims and narratives of injury. Complex legal problems 
were thus transformed into compelling narratives of injustice and redeployed in the public 
sphere. The cases gave new energy and focus to variously situated civil society groups, catalyzed 
the formation of entirely new NGOs, and provided a focal point for political mobilization outside 
of the courts.  
Two factors facilitated the efforts of activists to translate court rulings into compelling 
political narratives of injustice. First, court rulings and the logics that supported them were not 
legible to those without legal training. Judicial decisions are “technical accounts” as opposed to 
“stories” (Tilly 2006) and, as such, they are not easily accessible to a lay audience by their very 
nature. This inaccessibility affords an opportunity for political entrepreneurs to recast technical 
matters along stylized and emotive frames, presenting polarized narratives of injustice for public 
consumption. A second factor that enabled political actors to effectively convey strikingly 
different messages was media segmentation along ethnolinguistic lines. Although English is the 
common language for most educated and urbanized Malaysians, the vernacular press is divided 
among Chinese, Tamil, and Malay language media, each of which carried strikingly divergent 
coverage of the cases.  
                                                          
17 Press Release, PEMBELA, “Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam Desak Masalah Murtad Ditangani Secara 
Serius” [Defenders of Islam Urge More Seriousness in Handling the Apostasy Problem] (July 17, 2006) (on file 
with the authors). 
18 For a more detailed examination of these dynamics, see Moustafa (2013). 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 40 / 2015     18 
 
 
This polarization increasingly constrained both the courts and the government. Moreover, 
the political spectacle accompanying these cases exacerbated the dilemmas that attorneys, 
judges, and everyday citizens encountered in their efforts to maneuver through the Malaysian 
legal system. In the past, attorneys had found pragmatic ways of helping Malaysians change their 
official legal status, in spite of lacunas in the law.19  
Ironically, the tools and institutions that we instinctively turn to for justice—law and 
courts—are in fact a principal source of tension in the politics of religious liberty in Malaysia. 
Instead of resolving legal questions, the court system is hard-wired to produce legal 
controversies anew. Rather than simply arbitrate between contending parties, the court rulings 
have tended to exacerbate ideological cleavages. And, instead of assuaging uncertainties, courts 
have repeatedly instilled a tremendous degree of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anxiety around 
the meaning and content of ‘religious freedom’.  
4. Pakistan: Polarizing Protests 
When Pakistan was created in 1947, constructions of ‘the Muslim nation’ incorporated 
Shi’a and Ahmadi figures like Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the Father of the Nation) and Foreign 
Minister Zafarullah Khan. Sectarian minorities were able to cross over into a broadly secular or 
Sunni mainstream; doctrinal boundaries were blurred to make space for new political alliances; 
and religious boundaries were enlarged to facilitate the process of nation-building. Many 
different types of Muslims were encompassed within a Muslim-majority state guided by a 
broadly inclusive understanding of ‘Islamic ideology’. Over time, however, this framework 
changed as groups like the Ahmadis (and, more recently, the Shi’a) came to be excluded. The 
Ahmadis did not actively convert away from Islam; they were unilaterally deemed to be 
‘apostates’. 
                                                          
19 Malaysians had been able to secure state recognition of conversion by affirming a statutory declaration before a 
commissioner of oaths and registering a new name in the civil court registry through a deed poll. With these two 
documents, an individual could then secure a new identity card reflecting the name change, which signified one’s 
new, non-Muslim status. For most purposes, including marriage, one could then go on with life as one wished. 
(Ahmad 2005). 
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Pakistan’s early constitution-writing efforts sought to balance a concern for fundamental 
rights (including religious freedom) with a preambular nod to the sovereignty of God (“delegated 
to the state through its people” through their “chosen representatives”).20 This constitution-
writing process, however, was notable insofar as it involved lay Muslims deliberately seeking to 
marginalise Muslim clerics. In effect, Pakistan’s lay leaders sought to exclude clerical views in 
order to protect a broader understanding of the nation.  
Even as the constitution-drafting process was still underway, however, clerics and 
conservative religious activists sought to reverse this pattern of marginalization. Describing the 
boundaries of Islam as ‘under threat’, they set aside the technical niceties of constitution drafting 
and sought to define the boundaries of the Muslim community on the streets. Attacking 
Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority as ‘apostates’ in a series of urban riots, they engaged in a cynical 
ploy to shore up their own position in defining the boundaries of the nation. But, in doing so, 
they were treated by state officials as vigilantes acting in defiance of state authority. And, in due 
course, they were demonized by the courts. In some cases they were even tried and jailed for 
‘treason’.  
During the 1950s, one might say, following Hirschl, the fundamental rights of the 
Ahmadis were prioritised by the courts against a coalition of religious activists who believed that 
constitutional references to ‘the sovereignty of God’ meant that the boundaries of the nation 
should be subject to their own rather specific ideas about ‘the limits prescribed by [Allah]’. 
In 1969, the Supreme Court decided an important case (Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri v. 
State of West Pakistan) to address the country’s increasing polarization between (a) clerical ideas 
about the ulema’s privileged position in defining ‘the limits prescribed by [Allah]’ and (b) lay 
                                                          
20 In Pakistan, questions about religious freedom and the Ahmadis relate to several constitutional provisions. These 
include provisions regarding (a) freedom of religious belief and practice (‘subject to public order’), (b) a prohibition 
on legislation considered ‘repugnant to Islam’, (c) ‘the legislative primacy of parliament’ (in light of ‘advice’ from a 
special council charged with assessing matters of repugnancy), (c) the formation of a Federal Shariat Court (1980) to 
determine whether laws are ‘repugnant to Islam’, and (e) ongoing debates about the extent to which, via 
constitutional amendments or routine legislation, parliament or the executive can make laws (including emergency 
laws) that do not merely regulate but substantively annihilate fundamental religious rights. See Nelson (2015). 
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constitutional ideas regarding the primacy of each citizen’s fundamental rights. In practice, 
however, the court merely recapitulated the marginalization of conservative clerics. It declared 
that the West Pakistan government would be permitted to close an incendiary anti-Ahmadi 
publication owing to a constitutional article (Article 20) stating that religious liberties were 
protected “subject to public order”. In effect the court insisted that anti-Ahmadi vigilantes 
jeopardised public order, and for this reason they must be constrained. The courts did not resolve 
religious disagreements; here again, the process of litigation and the legal language of public 
order merely hardened enduring patterns of religious-cum-political polarization.  
After 1973, Pakistan’s constitution was re-written. The drafting process retained most of 
the existing language regarding the sovereignty of God, the role of the state and its elected 
representatives, ‘the limits prescribed by [Allah]’, and so on. Some conservative religious leaders 
sought to introduce a constitutional amendment prohibiting the country’s Ahmadis from calling 
themselves Muslims, but Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto demurred. When these religious 
leaders (largely excluded from the Constituent Assembly owing to their poor showing in the 
1970 elections) threatened mass protests in a bid to press their claims, however, Prime Minister 
Bhutto reconsidered. Their proposed amendment enjoyed considerable popular support. And, in 
1974, it received the unanimous support of the legislature. In fact, for the first time, clerical 
voices grounded in threats of mass mobilization and public violence found their way into 
Pakistan’s constitutional law.  
After 1974, Pakistan adopted a new legal posture vis-à-vis exclusionary mobilizations 
undertaken in the name of religion: responding to public pressure, the state shifted its approach 
to accommodate both the religious views and the political practices associated with religious 
conservatives.  
A few years later, Pakistan’s constitutional amendment excommunicating the Ahmadis 
was challenged as a violation of the Ahmadis’ fundamental rights. And, in 1978, the Supreme 
Court (Abdur Rahman Mobashir v. Amir Ali Shah) sought new ways to frame its understanding 
of such rights, noting that, although the Ahmadis had been unilaterally excommunicated (and, as 
such, were prohibited by the constitution from calling themselves Muslims), their remaining 
constitutional freedoms were still in place. In effect, the court held that Ahmadi religious 
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practices were protected from vigilante interference because they did not interfere with the 
religious practices of others. Unfortunately, the ‘Mobashir’ ruling did not settle the relevant 
constitutional, legal, social, or political issues. Instead, it served as a driver of change in its own 
right. In particular, it prompted yet another group of clerics and conservative religious activists to 
threaten mass protests if their demands for constraints on peaceful Ahmadi practices were not 
met.  
Between 1984 and 1986 these threats set in motion two changes: one in the form of a 
constitutional amendment recasting preambular references to ‘the limits prescribed by [Allah]’ as 
a substantive constitutional article (2A); and one in the form of ordinary amendments to 
Pakistan’s Criminal Procedure Code, noting that any Ahmadi who referenced Muslim terms and 
practices—for example, describing his or her place of worship as a masjid—was guilty of 
causing a form of religious offense and, thus, disturbing public order. In fact these two reforms, 
growing out of mass mobilization inspired by the work of the courts, turned the legal-cum-
political tables around: it was no longer religious vigilantes who were seen, by the law, as 
disturbing public order; it was rather the Ahmadis who were seen as disturbing public order as 
heretical or blasphemous provocateurs. The reforms introduced between 1984 and 1986 simply 
gave the polarization associated with moral vigilantism a certain measure of legal cover. 
The constitutionality of these reforms was challenged, first in the Federal Shariat Court 
(Mujibur Reman v. Federal Government 1985) and then in Pakistan’s Supreme Court 
(Zaheeruddin v. the State 1993). At this point, important ideas about the formal legal status of 
‘fundamental rights’ were challenged. In particular, the court held that the legislature’s 
promulgation of regulatory measures (vis-à-vis various forms of peaceful religious practice) was 
entirely unfettered. In effect, the court did not use its powers to reduce existing levels of legal 
uncertainty regarding fundamental rights; it actually introduced a measure of legal uncertainty: 
which types of peaceful religious practice, under which conditions, would be seen by legislators 
as a ‘threat to public order’?  
In Pakistan, the legal status of polarizing street power focused on the exclusion of 
ostensibly heretical religious ‘others’ has slowly changed over time. Before 1986, religious 
vigilantes were prosecuted as a threat to public order. Since then, public disorder has become a 
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tried-and-tested political strategy for restricting the boundaries of Pakistan’s Muslim community 
within the terms of the law.  
Conclusion 
In these vignettes from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Malaysia and India, we provide an 
alternative account of the link between legal processes and religious tensions, one that considers 
closely the roles played by constitutional law and legal procedure in perpetuating, deepening, or 
sustaining conflict. We do not propose that law fabricates conflicts ex nihilo. In all cases, 
tensions among religious communities existed outside of law and pre-existed the court cases we 
examined. Similarly, we do not claim that law works alone to amplify existing social fissures. By 
integrating four mini-histories, we simply illustrate the complex manner in which law works in 
tandem with political and social forces. And although each vignette is used here illustrate a 
different way that law can and does produce polarization, it is important to note that all four 
modes of polarization are at play in all four cases. A more extended analysis of each case, which 
was not possible given space constraints, would reveal yet more striking parallels across the four 
cases. 
Among other things, these examples stand as counter-narratives to more standard bottom-
up accounts of conversion in Sri Lanka, Ahmadi exclusion in Pakistan, religious politics in 
Malaysia, or Hindutva in India. In these standard accounts law’s role is interpreted in the idiom 
of failure: in Sri Lanka, courts failed to definitively resolve grassroots disputes over conversion; 
in Pakistan, courts and constitutions failed to advance ideals of liberal inclusiveness; in 
Malaysia, poorly conceived legal principles heaped impossible burdens on non-Muslims; and, 
finally, India’s majoritarian bias crept into and subverted constitutional jurisprudence. In this 
standard account, polarization, conflict, and violence are thought to result not from law’s 
influence, but from law’s failure to influence society properly.  
Jumping to conclusions about the would-be effectiveness of a more perfectly designed 
law (to read these histories as narratives about ‘bad law’ or ‘botched law’), however, is to 
exculpate the real-world institutions and mechanisms that form a centerpoint of strife. This 
approach reads social, legal, and political history in a millenarian mode: waiting for the saving 
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power of true law to set things right. The majoritarian slant of Indian courts or the trumping 
power of ‘public order’ in Pakistan’s courts may well be deviations from an ideal designed in the 
philosophical ‘clean room’ of political liberalism, but they are certainly not aberrations as the 
law is lived and practiced in South and Southeast Asia.  
In offering these revaluations and alternative narrations, we strive to ‘normalize’ law’s 
role in sustaining, reshaping, and advancing social strife, by shining a light on some of the 
polarizing mechanisms of law. As seen in Sri Lanka, the protocols of litigation may render more 
binary and rigid what are often more fluid and flexible religious boundaries. In Pakistan, the 
powers of apex courts to authorize or de-authorize particular religious boundaries may merge 
with street-level politics to validate highly polarizing polemical claims about Islam. In Malaysia, 
court cases served as focal points for political activists to advance starkly different frames of 
interpretation for public consumption; even compromise-sensitive judicial decisions may 
undergo discursive polarization in ‘the court of public opinion’. And, in India, the language and 
opinions of court decisions cannot be fixed within a liberal politics; they may just as easily 
emerge as political slogans used to justify exclusionary politics. 
To see law’s polarizing potentials is not to dismiss law out-of-hand or to call for scholars 
to abandon the dominant form of institutional organization and dispute resolution in most parts 
of the world. Rather, we urge scholars to take seriously both the benefits and the costs of law-
making and legal institutions, and in doing so to introduce a new spirit of creativity, modesty and 
humility about the ameliorative powers of law. This may lead us back to a reaffirmation of 
liberal constitutionalism—”a second naïveté”, as Paul Ricouer would have it—but from a place 
of scrupulous pragmatism and clear-eyed realism about both the losses and the gains associated 
with the ‘rule of law’. 
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